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The public-private sector wage gap in Scotland in 2000 is analysed using the extension
sample of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS). Employing a switching regression
model, and testing for double sample selection from the participation decision and sector
choice, the wage gap is shown to be 10 % for males and 24 % for females. For males this is
mainly due to differences in productive characteristics and selectivity, while for females the
picture is more ambiguous. Findings also suggest that there exists a male private sector wage
premium. While there is no evidence of a sample selection bias for females, the sector choice
of males is systematically correlated with unobservables. Furthermore, the structural
switching regression indicates that expected wage differentials between sectors are an
important driving force for sectoral assignment.
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I. Introduction
Devolution has brought partial political and economic independence to some
regions in the United Kingdom. Prominently, Scotland is among those regions and
has elected its own parliament in 1999. However, devolution has had surprisingly
little impact on public sector pay setting arrangements across the country while it
may have increased the relative size of the sector in devolved regions. The aim of
this paper is therefore to establish whether a Scottish public sector earnings premium
exists at the outset of the devolution and how, if at all, results differ compared to
* I benefited from comments by Pierre-Carl Michaud, Hartmut Lehmann, Kostas Mavromaras
and discussions with Steven Stillman. I am also very grateful for comments by my colleagues at
CERT and two anonymous referees. This paper does not reflect the opinion of the Prime
Minister’s Strategy Unit. Correspondence address: London Business School, Centre for New &
Emerging Markets, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, UK +44 (0) 20 72625050 email:
aheitmueller@london.edu. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 296
other UK studies. Differences between the market rate and earnings in the public
sector will also raise the question whether it is in the interest of Scotland to remove
any wage premium if granted the necessary autonomy. This is of particular
importance given that Scotland finds it ever more challenging to compete for
skilled employees in a buoyant British labour market and circumvent out-migration
to other parts of the UK.
In general, understanding potential wage differentials between the public and
private sector presumes an understanding of the pay determination. The economic
literature on public-private sector wage differentials offers various theoretical
explications for the existence of wage premiums both in the public and private
sector, reviewed comprehensively in Bender (1998) and Gregory and Borland (1999).
The fundamental and most widely used explanation has been that wage
determination in the public sector is subject to an ultimate political constraint
whereas the private sector is characterised by a profit constraint. For example,
public sector employees do not only produce goods and services but also engage
in vote-producing activities, which may justify higher pay (Gunderson 1979).
Furthermore, trade unions may exhibit more freedom to bargain as public sector
services are essential and labour demand is, therefore, rather inelastic.
Unsurprisingly, union membership density across many developed countries is
much higher in the public sector compared with the private sector (Gregory and
Borland 1999). This is also the case, for instance, in the UK, where unions in the
private sector lost ground in the 1980s but remained relatively strong in the public
sector.
On the other hand, it is not clear a priori why public sector employees should
enjoy higher wages despite the above explanations. As Gregory (1990) argues,
employees in the public sector may enjoy fringe benefits such as longer holidays,
greater job satisfaction or superior pension schemes compared with private sector
employees. Hence, wages for similar employees in comparable jobs should be
lower in the public sector. Since these fringe benefits are rarely observed in empirical
studies they may lead to an observed private sector wage premium which in fact is
just a compensation for the lack of fringe benefits.
The validity of theories, however, depends very much on the economic,
institutional and political environment. Elliott et al. (1999) list several possible
dimensions through which wage setting in both public and private sector may be
affected, such as changes in the product market environment, pressure to contain
production costs, new production technologies, changes in the role of unions and
political pressure to decrease public spending. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 297
In the United Kingdom, wage setting has been characterised by the principle
of comparability between public and private sector pay for the last 100 years or so.
A paramount aim of governments has been to guarantee equal pay across sectors.
This commitment played a particularly crucial role in the late 1940s when the public
sector was expanded significantly due to the nationalisation of former private
industries, as Bender (2003) reports. In the second half of the 1980s, however,
many of these nationalised industries were re-privatised and the role of trade
unions diminished. At the same time the principle of comparability of wages was
replaced by the comparability of the growth rates of the average wage. Pay Review
Boards, first introduced in the early 1970s to review wages and pass
recommendation to the government, were extended to cover further occupations.
Wage bargaining was further decentralised in the early 1990s.
However, devolution has not intensified this trend. While some public sector
occupations in Scotland are negotiated at a Scottish rather than a UK-wide level
(e.g. central government, local authorities, teachers, and prison officers) for still a
large number regional flexibility in pay setting is limited (e.g. police and fire-services,
universities, and UK government departments with a presence in Scotland).
Additionally, hybrid systems are operated in areas such as the NHS.
The principle of pay comparability should assure that the public-private sector
wage differential in the UK is rather small. However, the ambiguous existence of
pay differentials found in several empirical studies may indicate a lack of
enforcement of these policies. Studies for the UK on sectoral wage differentials are
scarce.
A number of empirical studies based on micro-level data have been published
in the last two decades or so drawing on mainly four different data sources: the
New Earnings Survey (NES) (Elliott and Murphy 1987, Gregory 1990, and Elliott
and Duffus 1996), the General Household Survey (GHS) (Rees and Shah 1995 and
Disney and Gosling 1998), the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) (Bender and
Elliott 1999) and more recently the British SCELI survey (Bender 2003). These
studies vary significantly in methodology, scope, and findings.
At the same time there is a noticeable lack of studies on earnings differences
across UK regions. In the only UK-wide study Henley and Thomas (2001) show
that private and public sector employment are weakly positively correlated across
British regions using BHPS data. However, they also find evidence of significant
regional differences in public-private sector pay gaps. In a second study which
has evolved in parallel to this paper Elliott et al. (2004) analyse pre- and post-
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Survey (LFS). They find a decline in the average public sector premium in the post-
devolution period but also show that the pay gap varies along the earnings
distribution. The authors argue that bringing public sector pay in line with private
sector wages may therefore increase efficiency but may also increase earnings
inequality.
In this paper, new data from the BHPS is used to analyse wage differentials in
the public and private sector in Scotland for the post-devolution period. In contrast
to other UK-wide and regional studies the paper accounts explicitly for possible
sample selection bias from both sector choice and labour participation and explores
its impact on the pay gap.1
The paper is structured as follows. The next section will describe the data set
and provide some descriptive statistics. Section III outlines the econometric
framework and discusses identification issues. Finally, Section IV reports the results
on wage equations and decomposition and the final Section discusses policy
implications.
II. Data
The data is drawn from the BHPS. Since its introduction in 1991, over 5,000
households made up of roughly 10,000 individuals have been interviewed annually.
While it has always been a nationally representative sample, only since 1999
extension samples for Scotland and Wales have been launched, aiming to increase
the relatively small sample size - approximately 500 households in each country - to
1,500 households. The main objective has been to enable independent analysis of
the two countries on a representative level.
The sample of employees contains only individuals who are, at the date of the
interview, full-time employees, aged 16 to 64 (16 to 59 for women), not self-employed
and not working in either agriculture, non-profit organisations or for the armed
forces. Since the econometric framework requires identification variables which
are only available for some waves, the paper makes use of data from wave 10 in
2000.
The resulting overall cross-section sample consists of 1,054 males and 1,230
females of which 61% of males and 42% of females are participating in the labour
1 Even though Bender (2003) controls for sample selection from the sector choice, the
selection term is not separately stated in the decomposition and it is also unclear whether that
component is part of the explained or unexplained part which might have a significant impact
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market. Of these, roughly 22% of men and 41% of women are employed in the
public sector. Appropriate cross-section weights have been applied to enable
separate analysis for Scotland only.
The total number of females employed in the public sector follows a u-shape,
the number for men fell since 1996, peaked in 1999 before dropping in the following
year and has risen again since. As one would expect, the latest increase in male
public sector employment is mainly driven by increases in civil service and local
government jobs in the aftermath of devolution and the instalment of the Scottish
Parliament. This development is also present among females although it is less
pronounced. Unsurprisingly, the percentage of women working in health care and
higher education is far higher compared to men. On the other hand, men dominate
jobs in the central governments as well as in the civil service. However, the largest
share of public sector employment for both men and women stems from local
governments.
Furthermore, public sector workers are selected differently into occupations.
For both men and women, public employees are more likely to be found in
managerial occupations compared to their private counterparts. This is especially
pronounced for females where 63% are employed in this occupation compared to
only 31% in the private sector. Additionally, public workers are more likely to be in
professional rather than in unskilled occupations. However, whether the above
patterns are supply or demand driven is a priori not clear.
Figure 1 depicts the unconditional log wage distribution in the public and
private sector by gender. Following the usual convention in the literature (e.g.
Booth at al. 2003) wages are expressed in log hourly gross pay.2 As Figure 1
shows, the male pay distribution in the public sector is less spread compared to
the private sector distribution though there is a significant overlap. Furthermore,
the mean wage in the former is higher than in the latter. The respective mean log
wages in the public and private sector are 2.2 and 2.0. A simple “difference in
means” test reveals that the pay in the public sector is indeed significantly higher
than in the private sector even on the 1% significance level. In contrast, the overlap
in the female public and private earnings distribution is much smaller compared to
males. Public pay is systematically higher in the upper end and much flatter at the
lower end of the distribution compared to the private one. Once again, the difference
in means between public (2.15) and private (1.74) sector is positive and significant
2 The log hourly gross wage rate is defined as w = ln[ Paygu / ((30/7) (Hs+aHot)) ], where
Paygu is the monthly gross pay in the current job, Hs is standard weekly hours, Hot is paid
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at the 1% level. Hence, on average, there is a substantial and significant pay gap
for both males and females. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the equality of the public
and private distribution is clearly rejected for both males and females.
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III. Econometric framework
The paramount aim of the paper is to estimate wages in the public and private
sector in order to study the causes of the unconditional earning differentials and
derive a structural switching equation that determines the sector choice. Hence,
in the following a switching regression model is adopted (Lee 1978) that estimates
separate wage equations for the public and private sectors. Let w1,i and w2,i be the
hourly wages in the public and private sector, respectively. Thus, the two log wage
equations to be estimated are:
'
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(2)
where Xi is a matrix of explanatory variables, b the vector of corresponding
coefficients to be estimated and e  the error term. Henceforth, the index  j = 1,2
refers to public and private sector, respectively.
In general, simple OLS of equations (1) and (2) may lead to inconsistent
estimates. First, OLS estimates are prone to suffer from sample selection bias due
to the exclusion of non-participants in the labour force. If the participation decision
is systematic the pool of employees is non-random. This problem is commonly
addressed by including an additional regressor which corrects for the bias in the
participation decision (Heckman 1979). Second, given the participation decision,
individuals have to decide in which sector to work. Again, if the assignment to
public or private employment is non-random, OLS estimates are biased and a
further correction term for this type of self-selection is required (Maddala 1983,
Maddala and Nelson 1975). The recent literature on public-private sector earning
differentials has mainly accounted for the latter and widely ignored the former.3
However, controlling for one type of selection in earnings equations only and
ignoring non-labour force participants may still lead to biased estimates.
Hence, this section will closely follow an approach by Co et al. (1999) used to
study self-employment decisions, adjusting for multiple selection types. In order
to test, and potentially account for, both types of selection, a double sample
selection model can be fitted (Tunali 1986). Let the reduced form participation and
sector choice equations be determined by
i i i u Z P + = g
' *
where P* and S*  are latent variables, Z and B the vectors of characteristics, g  and
m  the coefficients to be estimated and mi and ni  the error terms for participation and
sector respectively.
An individual will participate in the labour market if the utility of participation
exceeds the gain of non-participation. Similarly, individuals will choose the public
sector if the expected earnings differential is positive and/or personal preferences
for public sector employment are strong. These preferences may be correlated
i i i X w , 2 2
'
, 2 , 2 ln e b + =
3 The only exception the author is aware of is Stillman (2000) in a study on the Russian labour
market.
(3)
i i i v B S + = m
' *
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with individual characteristics and captured in B.4 Note that the expected earnings
difference is not observable prior to the estimation of the wage equations (1) and
(2). Hence, we will first estimate the reduced sector choice equation to gain
consistent wage estimates and only then the structural switching regression.
Since neither latent variable is observable, two index functions are defined. In
the case of participation this is Pi = 1 if P* > 0 and Pi = 0 if P* £ 0, where Pi = 1 and
Pi = 0  indicate labour market participation and non-participation respectively.
Similarly, for the reduced sector choice equation Si = 1 if S* > 0  and Si = 0 if S* £ 0,
where Si = 1  and Si = 0 indicate public or private sector employment, respectively.
Clearly, Si = 1 and Si = 0 are only observed for Pi = 1.
Given the above structure, consistent estimates can be achieved by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) (Co et al. 1999). Yet, the number of parameters to be
estimated is rather large. Alternatively, a simple two-step Heckman (1979) approach
with extended correction terms may be adopted (see, e.g., Lee 1979, Ham 1982,
Fishe et al. 1981 and Tunali 1986). In the first, step equations (3) and (4) are estimated
and sample selection correction terms are constructed. In the second step, equations
(1) and (2) are estimated via simple OLS including the correction terms as additional
regressors.
Two cases can be distinguished, ruv = 0 and ruv ¹ 0 where r is the error correlation
term between equation (3) and (4) and the former is a special case of the latter.5 For
ruv ¹ 0 the approach is to estimate (3) and (4) using a bivariate probit (Ham 1982,
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where  2
v s and  2
u s  are normalised to unity for identification purposes following
4 For a more rigorous theoretical derivation see, e.g., van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988).
5 In the extreme case where the participation and sector choice depend solely on the difference
between reservation wage and either public or private sector wage the decision to participate
and the sector choice are indeed simultaneous. Yet, the two decisions are likely to depend on the
expected utility which is impacted on by more than simply wage differences. The bivariate
probit is a way to check whether the decisions are correlated or not. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 303
standard practice.6 Maximum likelihood of the bivariate probit leads to four sample
selection correction terms
1 ' '
2 / 1 2
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6 Since the covariance of e1 and e2 is not identifiable in this model, the covariance matrix has
been split into two matrices (see Co et al. 1999 for details; see Koop and Poirier 1997 for a
discussion on these identification issues).
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where r = ruv. Again, =f and F are the univariate standard normal density and
distribution functions respectively, and F the bivariate standard normal distribution
function. Equations (5) to (8) collapse to the usual univariate Heckman expressions
for ruv = 0.
Now, the wage equations (1) and (2) can be re-written as




, 1 ˆ ˆ ) 1 , 1 , | (ln s i v p i u i i i i i X S P X w E l r s l r s b + + = = =
where the correction terms are according to (5)  to (8).
(9)
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IV. Decomposition
Once wages are consistently estimated, differences in public and private sector
pay can be decomposed into several components. In the following a modified
decomposition methodology is applied suggested by Neuman and Oaxaca (2002).
According to this the wage gap is split into three terms such that
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ( / ln 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 X X X w w b b b + - + - =
where  w ln is the predicted mean log wage,  X the mean vector of characteristics,
b ˆ  the estimated vector of coefficients, and l ˆ the estimated mean correction term.
Yet, l ˆ is a non-linear function in  gˆ '
i Z and  m ˆ '
i B and the central tendency is estimated
as  , / ˆ ˆ
1 å = =
j N
i j i N l l where  i l ˆ is the estimated correction term from the first step
in equation (3) and (4) and  j N refers to the respective set of observations in each
sector (Even and Macpherson 1990).
Similar to the simple Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca 1973) the term  1 2 1 ˆ ) ( b X X -
is the explained and  ) ˆ ˆ ( 2 1
'
2 b b - X the unexplained part of the predicted mean
wage gap. However, it is a priori unclear how to tread the selection terms in equation
(11). One way of dealing with them is by subtracting the terms from the left hand
side which leaves one with the familiar Oaxaca decomposition where the left hand
side is now the selectivity corrected wage differential as opposed to the observed
differential (e.g. Reimers 1983).7
V. Estimation results
A. Identification and variable choice
Estimating the above two step model requires some identification assumptions
on the coefficients and the covariance parameters (Tunali 1986). First, as already
stated,  2
v s and  2
u s are normalised to 1. Depending on whether the selection
)], ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ˆ [ 2 , 2 2 , 2 22 1 , 1 1 , 1 11 s i v p i u s i v p i u l r l r s l r l r s + - +
(11)
7 Equation (11) can be decomposed differently by using the private sector wage structure  2 ˆ b as
weight rather than the public wage structure  . ˆ
1 b Since results may vary, both methods are
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equations are independent, further identification assumptions are necessary. In
case  , 0 = uv r the matrices  '
i Z and  '
i B are required to contain at least one element
that is not part of 
'
, j i X (j=1,2). In the second case, where  , 0 ¹ uv r an additional
identification is necessary in order to estimate  . vu s Hence, at least one element in
'
i Z must not be contained in  '
i B and vice versa. Additionally, these variables must
not be part of  .
'
, j i X
In the case of the participation equation, identification has often been achieved
by controlling for the number of children. Hence, data on the number of children in
two age groups, 0-11 and 12-18 are included in the participation equation and not
in either the sector choice or wage equations.
More difficult, however, is the identification of the sector choice equation (4).
It has been argued that social background characteristics do not impact on the
wage but on the sector decision. Various variables such as father’s and mother’s
education and occupation and the number of siblings have been used for
identification (see, e.g., Bender 2003 and Hartog and Oosterbeek 1993).
Even though the BHPS contains questions on, for example, the occupation of
the respondent’s father, the number of observations is very small and does not
allow the use of these variables. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that public
sector employees are far more likely to be unionised compared to private sector
workers (see e.g. Gregory and Borland 1999). Hence, one alternative identification
measure is union status. On the other hand, union status is usually controlled for
in the wage equation as well and using it in the sector choice equation as an
identification variable would render this unfeasible. The BHPS, however, asks
individuals about their perception and the importance of unions.8  Since union
status and union perception are positively correlated but well below unity, which
makes it possible to treat them as two distinct variables, union perception has
been used as identification in the sector choice equation. Unfortunately, this
question is only included in wave 10 and not in the latest wave.
Besides the identification variables,  '
i Z and  '
i B contain information on personal
characteristics such as age, marital status and education. In addition, the sector
choice equation also controls for occupation, firm size and job tenure. The wage
equations contain the same set of regressors except for the identification variables.
Additionally, appropriate sample correction terms are included depending on the
model estimated.
8 In particular, individuals are asked whether strong trade unions are needed to protect the
working conditions and wages of employees. Four possible answers can be given which range
from strong agreement to disagreement. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 306
Several features are worth mentioning in the sample.9 First, as already shown,
women are far more likely to be employed in the public sector. Women in the public
sector are also significantly less likely to have children aged 0-11 but slightly more
likely to have older children compared to men. This also holds for the private
sector.
Second, union coverage is significantly higher in the public sector for both
men and women. This also carries over into the perception of unions. Employees
of both sexes in the public sector perceive unions as an important institution.
Furthermore, public sector workers are more likely to be married and exhibit far
greater job attachment. Yet, there are only minor differences in terms of educational
levels. On the other hand, as already mentioned, both men and women in the
public sector are more likely to be found in managerial positions compared to their
private sector counterparts.
B. Estimation results
Univariate and bivariate results for both males and females do not support a
simultaneous estimation of the participation and sector choice decision.10 The
correlation coefficient  uv r is not significantly different from zero. Furthermore, the
assumption of correlation does not change the estimated coefficients substantially,
which is not uncommon in this literature (e.g., Fishe et al. 1981 and Tunali 1986).
For male employees the following patterns with respect to participation and
sector choice arise. First, young people (aged 16-20) are significantly less likely to
both select themselves into the public sector and participation compared to the
base category (employees aged 31 and older). Many studies have ascribed the age
effect to queuing for public sector jobs (see, e.g., Bender 1998 and van der Gaag
and Vijverberg 1988).
Second, married men are significantly more likely to participate in the labour
market compared to unmarried males. Yet, the marital status has no impact on the
sector choice. Similarly, men with children (aged 0-11) are more likely to be found
working compared to males without children. This holds also for men with older
children, however, the effect is not statistically different from zero in the univariate
probit case.
Third, the identification variables on trade union perception perform well.
9 A summary table with sample characteristics can be obtained upon request.
10 Full tables with univariate and bivariate results can be obtained from the author. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 307
Employees who regard trade unions as important for the protection of working
conditions and wages select themselves into public sector jobs compared to
individuals who do not adhere to this perception.
Unsurprisingly, individuals employed in small or medium sized firms have a
higher probability of working in the private sector.11 Education and job tenure on
the other hand do not impact significantly on either decision with some exceptions
in the univariate probit case.12 Finally, occupation matters for the sectoral decision.
Individuals are significantly more likely to be employed in the public sector if they
work in managerial or non-manual occupations.
The results for women are very similar, with some exceptions. First and somewhat
surprisingly, females with children have a lower participation probability compared
to women with very young children. Furthermore, obtaining a higher degree
significantly increases the likelihood of labour market participation. Similarly,
professional occupation increases the probability of public sector employment, as
does job tenure.
In the second step, wage equations for public and private employment have
been estimated using the probit results to construct selection correction terms.
Tables 1 and 2 report the results for men and women respectively. Alongside OLS
results, selection corrected wage equations are estimated for both the univariate
and bivariate case. Standard errors for models 3 to 6 are based on a simple re-
sampling bootstrap method (see Efron and Tibshirani 1993 for details) as the
calculation of the corrected variance-covariance matrix is cumbersome. Thus, 1000
samples of size N are drawn from the original sample (parent sample) with
replacement. For each sample all coefficients are re-estimated and then used to
derive standard errors and confidence intervals.13
11 The majority of public sector workers working in small establishments is employed with local
governments or work in town halls.
12 Yet, once one does not control for occupation, education exhibits a significant impact on
the sector decision. Hence, the main effect of education is on occupation and occupation then
affects the sector choice.
13 Three different types of intervals have been calculated, the normal (N), the percentile (P)
and the bias correct (BC). If the bootstrap statistics are roughly normally distributed, the
normal and percentile intervals will be fairly similar. However, if there are significant differences,
percentile intervals are usually preferred. Furthermore, the point estimate of the original
sample and the average statistic of the bootstrap do not necessarily agree and their difference
is referred to as bias. Then, the bias corrected confidence interval takes these possible
discrepancies into account. If the bias is small, percentile and bias corrected confidence intervals
are roughly identical. Hence, all three intervals will be very similar for an approximately
normally distributed bootstrap statistic and a small bias. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 308
Table 1. Estimation results for males and three different model specifications
                  OLS                    Univariate probit             Bivariate probit
                    (no correction)                correction                      correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Private Public Private Public Private
Constant 1.715 1.931 1.020 2.256 0.810 2.124
(0.154) *** (0.077) *** (0.402) ** (0.180) *** (0.459) * (0.137) ***
Age 16-20 -0.347 -0.568 -0.493 -0.586 -0.617 -0.637
(0.263) (0.081) *** (0.407) (0.164) *** (0.434) (0.103) ***
(N)(BC)
Age 21-30 -0.220  -0.151 -0.207 -0.186 -0.196 -0.173
(0.104) ** (0.055) *** (0.132) (0.065) *** (0.130) (0.064) ***
Married 0.162 0.161 0.193 0.124 0.256 0.159
(0.072) ** (0.048) *** (0.141) (0.071) (0.134) ** (0.070) ***
Member of union 0.125 0.060 0.255 0.080 0.246 0.076
(0.070) * (0.052) (0.093) *** (0.054) (0.086) *** (0.055)
Professional 0.741 0.769 0.747 0.810 0.704 0.784
(0.156) *** (0.084) *** (0.198) *** (0.102) *** (0.190) *** (0.100) ***
Managerial 0.643 0.763 0.774 0.811 0.780 0.810
(0.107) *** (0.070) *** (0.134) *** (0.082) *** (0.140) *** (0.079) ***
Skilled 0.305 0.183 0.433 0.242 0.489 0.269
non-manual (0.090) *** (0.065) *** (0.133) *** (0.078) *** (0.143) *** (0.077) ***
Skilled manual 0.052 0.199 -0.135 0.134 -0.106 0.147
(0.102) (0.061) *** (0.143) (0.074) ** (0.138) (0.071) **
Higher degree -0.025 0.272 -0.046 0.225 0.003 0.256
(0.222) (0.098) *** (0.294) (0.132) ** (0.290) (0.121) **
A-level -0.050 0.058 -0.020 0.045 0.007 0.063
(0.082) (0.048) (0.109) (0.062) (0.105) (0.059)
O-level -0.100 -0.118 -0.156 -0.147 -0.165 -0.140
(0.093) (0.054) ** (0.124) (0.067) *** (0.122) (0.061) ***
Job tenure -0.006 0.001 0.013 0.015 0.007 0.011
(0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010)
Job tenure sq 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) *
Small 0.062 -0.341 -0.073 -0.431 -0.031 -0.404
(0.104) (0.049) *** (0.140) (0.062) *** (0.130) (0.058) ***
Medium 0.047 -0.267 -0.010 -0.313 0.024 -0.291
(0.093) (0.054) *** (0.115) (0.065) *** (0.109) (0.060) *** PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 309
Table 1. (Continued) Estimation results for males and three different model
specifications
           OLS                   Univariate probit             Bivariate probit
                        (no correction)              correction                      correction
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public Private Public Private Public Private
lp (Participation) -0.164 -0.234 0.058 -0.079
(0.416) (0.257) (0.822) (0.236)
ls (Sector) 0.518 0.486 0.518 0.407
(0.178) *** (0.162) *** (0.230) ** (0.163) ***
r ju -0.283 -0.384 0.112 -0.160
(0.537) (0.360) (0.787) (0.380)
rjv 0.892 0.799 1.012 0.826
(0.186) *** (0.799) *** (0.288) ** (0.274) **
s jj 0.580 0.608 0.538 0.493
(0.171) ** (0.124) ** (0.436) ** (0.982) **
(P)(BC)  (P)(BC)
Observations 149 528 149 528 149 528
R-squared 0.46 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.51 0.56
Notes: OLS, sample selection terms based on separate probits, and sample correction terms
based on bivariate probit. Dependent variable is wage in public and private sector. Cross-section
weights applied. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard
errors in parentheses, where OLS standard errors are robust and the S.E. for the remaining
models are bootstrapped. (P) refers to percentile, (BC) to bias correct.
Clearly, significant coefficients are very similar across model specifications,
while significance levels vary. This is particularly pronounced for females. In
general, there is a tendency for standard errors in the OLS model to be slightly
smaller than estimated using bootstrapping. However, in the majority of cases this
only marginally affects significance levels.
Besides age, occupation has the most pronounced impact on wages in both
the public and private sector. Unsurprisingly, professional, managerial and non-
manual occupations yield significantly higher wages than unskilled occupations.
As expected, union membership significantly increases wages in the public
sector yet unions do not affect the private sector wage. In contrast, firm size does
impact on the latter, while it has hardly any affect on the former. Education has little JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 310
Table 2. Estimation results for females and three different model specifications
         OLS                    Univariate probit             Bivariate probit
                    (no correction)                correction                      correction
(1) (2) (3)   (4)              (5)               (6)
                            Public        Private Public     Private Public     Private
Constant 1.448 1.5041 .188 1.5671. 218 1.563
(0.159) *** (0.098) *** (0.287) *** (0.198) *** (0.267) *** (0.216) ***
Age 16-20 -0.500 -0.364 -0.628 -0.458 -0.560 -0.453
(0.119) *** (0.098) *** (0.219) *** (0.134)*** (0.202) *** (0.122) ***
Age 21-30 -0.201 0.005 -0.269 -0.052 -0.262 -0.047
(0.099) ** (0.056) (0.146) * (0.087) (0.139) * (0.087)
Married 0.020 0.0900 0.008 0.064 0.003 0.057
(0.051) (0.053) * (0.055) (0.058) (0.055) (0.061)
Member 0.163 0.001 0.172 0.007 0.171 0.006
of union (0.065) ** (0.050) (0.066) *** (0.052) (0.067) *** (0.052)
Professional 0.723 0.779 0.860 0.900 0.840 0.883
(0.197) *** (0.129) *** (0.253) *** (0.181) *** (0.228) *** (0.174) ***
Managerial 0.786 0.530 0.930 0.660 0.922 0.653
(0.151) *** (0.081) *** (0.215) *** (0.135) *** (0.192) *** (0.130) ***
 Skilled 0.500 0.250 0.544 0.282 0.538 0.278
non-manual (0.157) *** (0.066) *** (0.178) *** (0.078) *** (0.163) *** (0.075) ***
Skilled manual 0.243 0.218 0.248 0.235 0.260 0.243
(0.195) (0.080) *** (0.218) (0.093) *** (0.219) (0.093) ***
Higher degree 0.251 0.321 0.244 0.360 0.265 0.389
(0.104) ** (0.106) *** (0.122) ** (0.144) *** (0.129) ** (0.147) ***
A-level -0.125 0.110 -0.151 0.090 -0.151 0.088
(0.072) * (0.059) * (0.084) * (0.069) (0.083) ** (0.068)
(N)
O-level -0.292 -0.005 -0.305 -0.024 -0.311 -0.031
(0.097) *** (0.055) (0.101) *** (0.062) (0.105) *** (0.062)
Job tenure 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.007 0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Job tenure sq -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Small 0.031 -0.194 -0.031 -0.249 -0.024 -0.244
(0.068)  (0.068) *** (0.094) (0.090) *** (0.092) (0.089) ***
Medium 0.039 -0.049 -0.017 -0.107 -0.020 -0.113
(0.077) (0.070) (0.097) (0.091) (0.100) (0.095)
lp (Participation) 0.055 0.094 0.058 0.112
(0.102) (0.138) (0.126) (0.155) PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 311
Table 2. (Continued) Estimation results for females and three different model
specifications
        OLS                      Univariate probit            Bivariate probit
                     (no correction)                correction                       correction
(1) (2)   (3)      (4)  (5) (6)
                             Public   Private    Public       Private   Public      Private
effect on male public sector wages. The picture for females is more diverse, e.g.,
having a higher degree increases wages in the public sector; in contrast, A- and O-
level holders perform worse in all three models in the public sector.
For males, sector selection has a significant impact on wages. Given conditional
expected wages (equations (9) and (10)), employees working in the public or private
sector perform better than a random individual would have done as the positive
and significant coefficients on the correlation terms show. However, there is no
indication for a participation bias in the univariate model and only weak evidence
in the bivariate specification. For women neither selection coefficient is significant
regardless of the model specification. This is surprising since the labour force
participation for females in the sample is much lower compared to men.14
ls (Sector) 0.192 0.249 0.180 0.227
(0.188) (0.202) (0.167) (0.191)
rju 0.143 0.223 0.495 0.317
(0.253) (0.308) (0.409) (0.397)
rjv 0.499 0.594 0.158 0.643
(0.406) (0.396) (0.306) (0.564)
sjj 0.384 0.419 0.364 0.353
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.052) ** (0.060) **
Observations 214 302 214 302 214 302
R-squared 0.47 0.38 0.48 0.39 0.48 0.39
Notes: OLS, sample selection terms based on separate probits, and sample correction terms
based on bivariate probit. Dependent variable is wage in public and private sector.  Cross-section
weights applied. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5 %, ***significant at 1%. Standard errors in
parentheses, where OLS standard errors are robust and the s.e. for the remaining models are
bootstrapped. (N) refers to normal.
14 The reported correlation terms and the standard deviations are constructed following Tunali
(1986). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 312
15 Note that Rees and Shah (1995) find the same for males but not for females while Bender
(2003) reports mainly positive contributions from both the explained and unexplained
components. Yet, since both the data and methodology are very different, comparisons have
to be drawn with caution.
C. Wage gap and switching regression
Given the above results, predicted log wages in the public and private sector
can be estimated consistently. Tables 3 to 5 report predicted log wages, differences
in predicted log wages and the decomposition of predicted log wages into various
parts according to equation (11) by gender and for three different model specifications.
Furthermore, results are shown for two different weighting specifications with
different base categories,  pri b b b = = 2
* and  , 1
* pub b b b = = as results are
usually different. Confidence intervals for significance tests have been bootstrapped
and refer to 1300 replications.
Regardless of the specification, the unadjusted wage gap between public and
private sector is statistically significant and around 10 % for males and 24 % for
females, which lies well in line with Rees and Shah (1995) but is slightly higher than
Bender’s (2003) findings for the whole of the UK. For men in all three models and
for either weighting scheme, the gap is more than accounted for by differences in
characteristics. In contrast, differences in returns reduce the unadjusted gap,
though the term is statistically insignificant. Hence, while returns to productive
and job-related characteristics are lower for those in the public sector, differences
in these characteristics of public sector employees more than counterbalance this
effect leading to higher wages in the public sector.15
Results are more sensitive against the weighting scheme for women. Using the
public wage structure the absolute figures are fairly similar to the male ones.
However, if the private sector wage structure is used as weight, only between 46
and 67 % of the wage difference is explained by differences in characteristics
suggesting a substantial public sector premium.
The model specifications with sample selection correction have an additional
term besides the explained and unexplained component. In the presence of sample
selection, unobserved productivity related characteristics will be captured in the
unexplained component in the simple OLS specification. The existence (or non-
existence) of wage premiums may, therefore, be simply due to these unobserved
characteristics rather than discrimination.
As the results show, the selection term is positive for both males and females




































Table 3. Pay gap between public and private sector: OLS results
             Males                                     Females
pri b b = * pub b b = * pri b b = * pub b b = *
Predicted log wages 2.2380 ln = pub w 2.0239 ln = pri w 2.1496 ln = pub w 1.7358 ln = pri w
pri pub w w ln ln -  0.2132 **  0.4140 **
* ) ( b pri pub X X -  0.2270 ** 0.2215 ** 0.1892 ** 0.3802 **
(106.0 %)  (104.0 %)  (46.0 %)  (92.0 %)
) ( * pri pri X b b - -  -0.0082 -  0.0338
(-4.0%) (8.0 %)
) ( * b b - pub pub X -0.0138  -  0.2248 **
(-6.0 %) (54.0 %) -
Note: Cross-section weights applied. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, where OLS standard
errors are robust and the s.e. for the remaining models are bootstrapped. (N) refers to normal, (P) to percentile, and (BC) to bias corrected confidence
































Table 4. Pay gap between public and private sector: Simple probit model.
                                              Males                                                      Females
pri b b = * pub b b = * pri b b = * pub b b = *
Predicted log wages 2.2392 ln = pub w 2.0263 ln = priv w 2.1516 ln = pub w 1.7369 ln = priv w
pri pub w w ln ln -  0.2128 **  0.4147 **
* ) ( b pri pub X X -  0.2950 ** 0.4198 ** 0.2763 **  0.4732 **
(139.0 %)  (197.0 %)  (67.0 %) (114.0 %)
) ( * pri pri X b b -  - -0.9866 **  - -0.2906
(-463.0 %) - (-70.0 %)
) ( * b b - pub pub X -0.8619 ** - -0.0936
(-405.0 %)  - (-23.0 %) -
Selection (due to differences in  0.7797 **  0.2321
the selection terms) (366.0 %) (56.0 %)
Sector choice  0.7389  **  0.2633 ** (BC)
Participation -0.0408 -0.0312
Selectivity corrected wage gap -0.5668  0.1826
Note: Cross-section weights applied. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, where OLS standard
errors are robust and the s.e. for the remaining models are bootstrapped. (N) refers to normal, (P) to percentile, and (BC) to bias corrected confidence




































Table 5. Pay gap between public and private sector: Bivariate probit model
                                          Males                                             Females
pri b b = * pub b b = * pri b b = * pub b b = *
Predicted log wages 2400 . 2 ln = pub w 2.0258 ln = pri w 2.1518 ln = pub w 7365 . 1 ln = pri w
pri pub w w ln ln -  0.2142 **  0.4152 **
 0.2913 ** 0.4194 **  0.2686 ** 0.4629 **
* ) ( b pri pub X X -
(136.0 %)  (196.0 %) (65.0 %)  (112.0 %)
         -1.033 ** -0.2501
(-482.0 %) (-60.0 %)
-0.9103 ** -0.0559
(-424.0 %) (-13.0 %)
Selection (due to differences  0.8332 **  0.2025
in the selection terms) (388.0 %) (48.0 %)
Selection choice  0.7740 **  0.2466 ** (BC)
Participation  0.0599 -0.0441
Selectivity corrected wage gap -0.6189 ** (BC)  0.2127
Note: Cross-section weights applied. *,**, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard errors in parentheses, where OLS standard
errors are robust and the s.e. for the remaining models are bootstrapped. (N) refers to normal, (P) to percentile, and (BC) to bias corrected confidence
intervals (1000 replications).
pub X (b pub - b*)
) ( * pri pri X b b - - -
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16 Results are not reported here but can be obtained from the author. In summary, unexplained
earnings differentials are small along the lower part of the male distribution suggesting a minor
public sector premium. Yet, at the top end there is indication of a private sector premium that
seems to dominate the average wage analysis. The reverse holds for females and at the lower
end of the distribution there is indication of a small private sector premium. This is very much
in line with the actual distributions shown in Figure 1.
component decreases substantially, suggesting a male wage premium, though  not
for the public but for private sector. In the OLS model this premium was
counterbalanced by unobserved heterogeneity, which highlights the importance
of a separate treatment of the selection component. Note that the selection effect
is driven by the sector choice rather than the participation choice. Furthermore, it
becomes apparent that even if observable characteristics and compensation were
identical in the two sectors, male public employees would still earn more due to
differences in unobservable productivity related characteristics.
Tables 4 and 5 report the selectivity corrected wage differentials in the bottom
row. Interestingly, only the male differential is significant and indicates that
correcting for non-random assignments into labour force and sector, the overall
wage gap becomes negative. For females, however, higher productivity
characteristics of public sector workers are fully outweighed by lower compensation
differences.
Hence, not accounting for selection bias may explain a large part of the male
differences compared to other studies for the UK or Scotland. For example, Bender
(2003) controls for sector selection but the unexplained part in the decomposition
does not separate these effects out which may lead to an overestimate of the
public sector premium. Elliott et al. (2004) do not account for selection in the first
place and results may suffer from the same problem.
Figure 1 has shown that there are not only differences in average wages but
also in the distribution of earnings. This is particularly pronounced for women.
The above decomposition, though appealing in its simplicity, fails to capture the
distribution of the unexplained earnings gap. However, employing a technique
developed by Jenkins (1994) shows that the results (with few exceptions) also
hold along the pay distribution.16
Bringing average wages in the public sector more in line with market rates
therefore might disproportionately affect individuals at the lower end of the earnings
distribution. However, the direction of change is very different by gender. While
men will actually benefit from such a policy, women will be affected negatively. As
a result, policy makers face a trade-off between efficiency and equity similar to the
one identified by Elliott et al. (2004). PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 317
Eventually, given the predicted wages, a structural switching regression
* '
, 2 , 1
* ) ˆ ln ˆ (ln i i i i v B w w S + + - = m d                                                                                 (12)
can be estimated, where  i i i i v v - - = ) ( , 2 , 1
* e e d and  i w , 1 ˆ ln and  i w , 2 ˆ ln are the
predicted wages for the public and private sector respectively (Maddala 1983, van
der Gaag and Vijverberg 1988 and Hartog and Oesterbeek 1993). For public sector
workers the private sector wage is a counterfactual and vice versa for private
sector employees.
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of both the reduced form (4) and the
structural switching regression (12) which takes expected earnings differences in
the sector choice explicitly into consideration. The vector of regressors is identical
to equation (4) except that the difference in expected predicted wages in the public
and private sector for an employee have been included as an instrumental variable.
Again, predicted wages are based on the single selection correction specification
for sector choice and simple OLS for males and females respectively.17
This specification requires some remarks. Equation (12) contains two estimated
regressors. Lee (1979) showed that the resulting coefficients d and m are consistent.
However, the standard errors are incorrect and need to be adjusted (Maddala
1983). Rather than recovering the corrected variance-covariance matrix,
bootstrapping is applied once more as described above.
Furthermore, recall that the set of characteristics for wage equation and sector
choice are identical except for the two variables on union membership and union
perception. Hence, the potential wage differential is already implicitly included in
the reduced form probit estimations. Yet, explicitly including the estimated
wage gap will have two effects. First, since the earnings difference is a non-
linear construct it will substitute for higher order terms. However, since all but
one regressor are dummy variables and the only continuous variable is tenure
which is included in both as a first and second order term, this should be of
lesser concern. Secondly, it will net-out the earnings effect from the coefficients
and the remaining effect can be seen as everything that impacts on the sector
choice except earnings.
17 Note, however, that the main results are not sensitive against the model specification used to
predict the expected wages. For example, the double sample selection specification for males
yields almost exactly the same results as the single sample selection one. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 318
Table 6. Marginal effects of the reduced form and switching regression for males
and females
                                              Males                                             Females
                                Reduced          Structural                  Reduced            Structural
                                   form                  form                        form                    form
Age 16-20 -0.149 -0.216 -0.246 0.229
   (0.032) *** (1.824) (0.084) *** (1.684)
Age 21-30 -0.035 0.009 -0.267  0.354
(0.038) (0.663) (0.049) *** (1.239)
Married  0.036  0.011 -0.054 0.167
(0.034) (0.478) (0.051) (0.648)
Higher degree  0.029  0.595 -0.082 0.204
(0.069) (1.709) (0.111) (1.397)
A-level  0.013 0.112 -0.095  0.564
(0.036) (0.563) (0.058) (1.054)
O-level -0.021 -0.038 -0.079  0.683
(0.038) (0.601) (0.057) (1.358) *** (P) (BC)
Small -0.125 -0.388 -0.230 -0.431
(0.035) *** (1.463) *** (BC) (0.060) *** (1.071) ***
Medium -0.056 -0.555 -0.197 -0.710
(0.035) (1.192) *** (BC) (0.061) *** (0.902)
Opinion on union 0.253 0.380 0.225 0.047
(very important) (0.069) *** (0.579) *** (0.091) ** (0.277)
Opinion on union 0.228 0.381 0.286 0.171
(important) (0.046) *** (0.604) *** (0.069) *** (0.223) *** (P) (BC)
Opinion on union -0.013 -0.074 0.177 0.103
(neutral) (0.056) (0.611) (0.091) * (0.264)
Job tenure  0.014  0.027 0.029 0.025
(0.006) ** (0.090) (0.011) *** (0.155)
Job tenure sq -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007)
Professional 0.057 0.229 0.447  0.497
(0.076) (1.087) (0.106) *** (2.274)
Managerial  0.134 0.312 0.489 -0.304
(0.056) ** (0.772) (0.074) *** (1.693) PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 319
Table 6. (Continued) Marginal effects of the reduced form and switching regression
for males and females
                                              Males                                           Females
                               Reduced            Structural                Reduced         Structural
                                  form                    form                      form                form
Skilled non-manual  0.141 -0.022 0.169 -0.496
(0.065) ** (0.725) (0.091) * (1.658)
Skilled manual -0.096 0.111 0.126 -0.006
(0.042) ** (0.828) (0.123) (2.013)
Wage differential  1.322 2.964
(2.97) *** (P) (BC) (3.029) ***
Observations 677 516
Notes: The male model is based on the univariate probit specification with sample selection
correction for sector choice only and the female model on simple OLS. *,**, and *** denote
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
The most interesting variable is certainly the predicted wage differential
between the public and private sector. Clearly, there is evidence that wage
differentials impact significantly on the sector choice. Both the male and female
effects on the expected wage differential between the public and private sector are
positive and highly significant. The marginal effect seems to be by far the largest
compared to other regressors. This is similar to what Hartog and Oesterbeek (1993)
find in their study for the Netherlands using a MLE approach and Lee (1978) for
the union/non-union decision. However, in both cases the coefficient rather than
the marginal effect is reported.
The interpretation of the marginal effect is cumbersome. Given that the predicted
wage differential is the difference in two log terms, a log percentage change in the
predicted wage differential increases the probability of choosing public sector
employment by roughly 1.3 and 2.9 % for men and women respectively.18 This is a
18 Neither Lee (1978) nor van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) put a meaning on the coefficient
of the predicted wage differential. On the other hand, Hartog and Oesterbeek (1993) interpret
the coefficient as selection elasticity. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 320
rather small effect compared to other variables such as firm size or union
perception.19
V. Implications and conclusions
Post-devolution public-private wage differentials in Scotland are studied using
newly available data from the BHPS to establish whether earnings differentials
exist and differ from the rest of the UK. In contrast to other UK-wide and regional
studies this paper controls for both sample selection from the participation decision
and the sector choice.
The wage gap is shown to be 10 % for males and 24 % for females. For males
this is mainly due to differences in productive characteristics and sector selection.
For females, the picture is more ambiguous. In contrast to other UK studies, there
is evidence of a male private sector wage premium that is mainly due to sector
selection emphasising the need to control for section bias. It is shown that wage
differentials between sectors are an important driving force for sectoral assignment.
Furthermore, results vary along the pay distribution. Evidence shows that private
and public sector premiums for men and women respectively are mainly an issue in
the upper parts of the earnings distributions.
While sector selection is expected to be responsible for a large part of the
differences in results compared with other UK studies, there may be further
explanations. Firstly, despite the devolution, wage setting in the public sector
does not match up with the new institutional arrangements and has not significantly
changed since 1999. Hence, the Scottish Executive is only partly responsible for
any pay differential. Secondly, Scotland faces fierce competition with the rest of
the country over skilled labour in both the public and private sector. While earnings
in the private sector can adjust to a tight labour market, the public sector often
lacks regional flexibility. Therefore, the distinct absence of a male wage public
sector premium in Scotland may also be partly the result of adjustments in the
private rather than public sector.
This is different for women where findings are more in line with UK wide
results. However, the high proportion of women in the public sector in general and
in health and education in particular combined with a relative shortage of staff in
19 However, it has been remarked that the effect at the mean is still likely to be large given the
large raw difference in public-private sector wages. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PAY DIFFERENTIALS 321
these sectors may go some way in explaining a higher female public sector pay
nationwide. In addition, there is relatively more regional independence in wage
bargaining for traditional female occupations such as local governments and
education.
Alternatively, if one is prepared to believe that the Scottish labour market
achieves an efficient allocation of labour, part of the male wage premium found in
the private sector may be ascribed to the existence of fringe benefits in the public
sector which are not captured in average hourly wages such as higher job security,
holidays and pension entitlements. Again, this seems to be different for women
and also implies a different fringe benefit culture north of the border. Theoretically,
the latter does not seem unreasonable as non-pecuniary benefits may well be a
means to increase the attractiveness of Scottish public sector jobs in the absence
of full pay autonomy. Yet, even some of these are still determined by Westminster
such as the Civil Service pensions scheme, making this explanation less compelling.
However, even if the Scottish Executive were granted the necessary
independence in public sector wage setting it is conceivable that it would only
ever want to pay market rates in occupations where it is not competing with other
UK labour markets. Hence, incentives to set public sector earnings in line with
private sector pay may be very small. A pay reform that grants more autonomy to
regions may therefore not necessarily remove public sector premiums but runs the
risk of introducing new trade-offs between regional efficiency, equity, and national
competitiveness. However, given the results in this paper, public sector pay in
Scotland may after all not be as far off market rates as suggested by other studies.
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